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ABSTRACT
Modelling the accumulation rule evolving public investment is an issue of utmost in-
terest among economists and politicians. The present paper extends the Barro (1990)
model of productive government expenditure by considering a time-adapted rule for the
public investment/output ratio. The rule allows a particular target on the public invest-
ment ratio to be achievable in the long-run. Additionally, throughout the transition, the
government may adjust its period-by-period public investment/output ratio in response
to the current productivity of public capital relative to its long-run level. The degree of
this response depends on a short-run policy instrument, which is decided by the fiscal
authority simultaneously to the long-run target ratio. That way, the government problem
could be interpreted as a coordination problem between short- and long-term policies. In
comparison with a constant-ratio rule, and under alternative taxing scenarios, important
welfare improvements are found when coordinating the short- and the long-run policy
instruments in an optimal way.
Keywords: Public investment rule, policy coordination, transitional dynamics, En-
dogenous growth
JEL Classification: E0, E6, O4.
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1. Introduction
Modelling the accumulation rule evolving public investment, and its effect on growth and
welfare, has been extensively analyzed by economists, specially since the empirical work
by Aschauer (1989) and Munell (1990) and the theoretical paper by Barro (1990). At
the same time, the coordination between long-run policy targets and short-run policy
interventions is being the subject of very detailed consideration by governments. When
the public sector announces a determined long-run policy,1 this long-run measure must
be coordinated with a particular active policy throughout the transition for convergence
to that target to be credible and achievable.
The relationship between short- and long-run policies has been widely studied in the
monetary policy literature [see Svensson (1999) and Taylor (1999), among many others].
The monetary authority is assumed to follow a particular policy rule, with a long-run
target (generally on inflation, nominal-GDP or money growth) as well as with a short-
run active rule response to the state of the economy. However, little work has been
done regarding the coordination between long- and short-run policies in the fiscal policy
literature and, more specifically, concerning the public investment rule. The present paper
attempts to make some progress along this line. To this purpose, we extend the Barro
(1990) model of productive government expenditure by considering the possibility of a
time-adapted rule for the public investment/output ratio.
The fiscal rule most often considered reduces to keeping a constant public expendi-
ture/GNP ratio [as in Barro (1990), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Turnovsky (1996,
2000), among many others]. In the paper, we consider a more flexible rule for the evo-
lution of public investment, although, by simplicity, we keep the constant-ratio rule for
unproductive public expenditures. The rule will allow a particular target on the public
investment ratio to be achievable in the long-run. This long-run target will be attained
in just one period under the constant-size rule. But, if the public investment ratio reacts
along the transition accordingly to the state of the economy, the fiscal authority will face
with a continuum of alternative paths for the public investment/output ratio leading all
of them to the pursued long-run target. That way, the government problem could be
interpreted as a coordination problem between short- and long-term policies.
In a very simple case, we will assume that the government may adjust its period-by-
period public investment/output ratio in response to the current productivity of public
capital relative to its long-run level. The degree of this response will depend on a short-run
policy instrument, which is decided by the fiscal authority simultaneously to the long-run
target ratio. Doing that, the paper focus upon: (a) the importance of a given long-run
policy target in the performance of a short-run policy rule, (b) the joint determination of
the short-run policy instrument and the long-run target to maximize welfare and (c) the
sensitivity of previous results to alternative financing scenarios.
1For instance, to homogenize future members, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union imposed
several long-run targets to be achieved by any country attempting to be a potential member of the
Union. As an additional example, the International Monetary Fund gives policy guidelines to countries
with economic troubles in order to improve long-run sustained economic growth.
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In general, the steady-state of the economy changes when a government implements a
policy aimed to a new long-run target. Hence, if the economy displays no transition, there
is no interesting role for short-run policies.2 On the other hand, a short-run policy might
allow for reducing the convergence speed substantially. That way, and in terms of welfare,
the long-run effect of a policy aimed to a long-run target is somewhat misleading, since
the steady-state may be reached only after a long time. Consequently, the relationship
between the convergence speed and the short-run policy performance turns out to be
crucial when measuring the impact on welfare of coordinating short- and long-run policies.
In comparison with the constant-ratio rule, and under alternative taxing scenarios,
we find an important welfare improvement when using our more flexible policy rule.
However, this welfare improvement depends upon whether coordination involves a long-
run downsizing or upsizing in public investment, and when the resultant convergence
to that target is fast or slow. In this respect, taxes and several structural parameters,
such as the output elasticities of private and public capital, the unproductive public
expenditure/output ratio and the elasticity of substitution, are found to be crucial.
Section 2 describes the framework for analysis. In section 3, the competitive equilib-
rium and a numerical method to solve the transitional dynamics along the competitive
equilibrium are described. In section 4, the main issues of the paper are approached.
Section 5 carry out a simple sensitivity analysis. Finally, section 6 offers main conclusions
and extensions.
2. The basic framework
In this section we describe a simple endogenous growth model with public and private
capital, and three economic agents: households, firms and a government.
2.1. Firms
There exists a continuum of firms, indexed by [0, 1], producing the single commodity good
in the economy. Private capital, k˜t, and labor, l˜t, are lent by households to the firms to
produce y˜t units of output.
The total amount of physical capital used by all the firms in the economy, K˜t, is
taken as a proxy for the index of knowledge available to each firm [as in Romer (1986)].
Additionally, public capital, K˜gt , affects the production process of all individual firms.
Except for these externalities, the private production technology is a standard Cobb-
Douglas function presenting constant returns to scale in the private inputs and increasing
returns in the aggregate. For any firm,
y˜t = f(l˜t, k˜t, K˜t, K˜
g
t ) = F l˜
1−α
t k˜
α
t K˜
θk
t
³
K˜gt
´θg
, θg, α ∈ (0, 1), θk ≥ 0, (2.1)
2At least, in a deterministic setting. In a stochastic steady-state, a short-run active policy will affect
the stochastic structure of the implied time series and the empirical density function of any variable,
including welfare.
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where α is the share of private capital in gross output, θg and θk are the elasticities of
output with respect to public capital and the knowledge index, respectively, and F is a
technological scale factor.
Since firms are identical, from (2.1), aggregate output, Y˜t, is produced according to,
Y˜t = FL˜
1−α
t K˜
α+θk
t
³
K˜gt
´θg
, (2.2)
where L˜t is aggregate labor.
During period t, each firm pays the competitive-determined wage w˜t on the labor it
hires and the rate rt on the capital it rents. The profit maximizing problem of the typical
firm turns out to be static,
Max
{lt,kt}
f(l˜t, k˜t, K˜t, K˜
g
t )− w˜tl˜t − rtk˜t.
Optimality leads to the usual marginal productivity conditions:
rt = f
0
k˜
= αF l˜1−αt k˜
α−1
t K˜
θk
t
³
K˜gt
´θg
= α
y˜t
k˜t
= α
Y˜t
K˜t
, (2.3)
w˜t = f
0
l˜
= (1− α)F l˜−αt k˜αt K˜θkt
³
K˜gt
´θg
= (1− α) y˜t
l˜t
= (1− α) Y˜t
L˜t
, (2.4)
where we have used the fact that each firm treats its own contribution to the aggregate
capital stock as given, rents the same amounts of the private inputs and produces the
same amount of output.
2.2. Households
The representative consumer chooses the fraction of time to spend as leisure. She is the
owner of physical capital, and allocates her resources between consumption, C˜t, and in-
vestment in physical capital, I˜kt . Private physical capital accumulates over time according
to
K˜t+1 = (1− δk)K˜t + I˜kt , (2.5)
where δk is the depreciation factor for private capital, between zero and one. Zero pop-
ulation growth is assumed and the time endowment is normalized to one. Decisions are
made each period to maximize the discounted aggregate value of the time separable utility
function,3
∞X
t=0
βtu(C˜t, ht) =
∞X
t=0
βt
h
C˜ρt (1− ht)1−ρ
i1−θ
− 1
1− θ , ρ ∈ [0, 1], θ > 0, θ 6= 1, (2.6)
=
∞X
t=0
βt
h
ρ ln C˜t + (1− ρ) ln(1− ht)
i
, ρ ∈ [0, 1], θ = 1,
3A CES representation is assumed for the single period utility function, capturing cross-substitution
between leisure and consumption [King et al. (1988)].
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where ht is the fraction of time devoted to production, β is the discount factor, between
zero and one, 1/θ is the elasticity of substituting consumption intertemporally and ρ
characterizes the importance of consumption relative to leisure.
Her single period budget constraint is
(1 + τ ct)C˜t + K˜t+1 + X˜t ≤ W˜tht + K˜t
£
1− δk + rt
¡
1− τkt
¢¤
, (2.7)
where K˜t+1 denotes the stock of physical capital at the end of time t, with K˜0 > 0, τkt and
τ ct are the tax rates applied to capital income and private consumption, respectively, and
X˜t is a net transfer made by households to the public sector, which could be negative.
The representative household faces a discrete dynamic programing problem, in which
corner solutions are avoided and restrictions hold with equality due to the special form of
the instantaneous utility function and the fact that consumption and leisure are normal
goods. Optimality conditions are standard: the consumption-saving decision (2.8), the
consumption-leisure choice (2.9), and the budget constraint (2.7),
C˜t+1
C˜t
=
(
β
µ
1− ht+1
1− ht
¶(1−ρ)(1−θ) £
1− δk + rt+1
¡
1− τkt+1
¢¤) 11−ρ(1−θ)
, (2.8)
ρ
1− ρ =
C˜t
(1− ht)
(1 + τ ct)
w˜t
. (2.9)
Additionally constraints are: C˜t > 0 and K˜t+1 > 0, ht ∈ (0, 1) and the transversality
condition, that places a limit on the accumulation of capital,4
lim
t→∞
βtK˜t+1
∂u(C˜t, ht)
∂C˜t
= 0. (2.10)
2.3. The public sector
The government is characterized as a fiscal authority. A broad classification of public
expenses is considered: unproductive public expenses, C˜gt , which do not directly affect
the productive process or consumers’ welfare, and public investment, I˜gt , which positively
affects production. Public capital is accumulated according to
K˜gt+1 = I˜
g
t + (1− δg)K˜gt , (2.11)
where δg is the public capital depreciation factor, between zero and one.
The government is assumed to be restricted to financing a given unproductive public
consumption/output ratio, κc, which remains constant over time (i.e., due to inefficient
bureaucratic or administrative costs, or the payment of interest on outstanding debt),
κc = C˜gt /Y˜t, κc ∈ [0, 1). (2.12)
4Consumption and physical capital are strictly positive because marginal utility at the origin is equal
to infinity.
6
Additionally, the government commits to following a pre-announced rule for I˜gt :
κit = I˜gt /Y˜t = κ¯i
µ
Y˜t/K˜
g
t
Y/Kg
¶η
, κit ∈ [0, 1− κc) for all t, (2.13)
where Y/Kg denotes the average product of public capital in the long-run, which, as we
will see, is constant in our setting.
The government chooses the values of κ¯i and η, which will induce a path for κit. In
general, this path will also depend on preferences, technology, the level of κc and the tax
system used to finance total public expenditures.
According to (2.13), κ¯i is a long-run target for κit. Along the transition, the ratio κit
will respond to the current productivity of public capital relative to its long-run value.
This reaction depends upon the magnitude and the sign of η, which can be considered
as a short-run policy instrument : (a) if η = 0, κit = κ¯i every period and (2.13) becomes
a passive rule; in all other cases, (2.13) is an active rule: (b) when η > 0, κit raises
above (falls below) κ¯i when the average product of public capital is higher (lower) than
its long-run level, while (c) the public investment ratio exhibits the opposite relationship
when η < 0.
We assume that tax revenues finance total public expenses every period. For the sake
of simplicity, just two polar tax financing alternatives are considered, both with constant
tax rates: (i) capital income taxes, under which the government budget constraint is:
C˜gt + I˜
g
t = X˜t + τ
kK˜trt, (2.14)
and (ii) consumption taxes, and the government budget constraint now becomes:
C˜gt + I˜
g
t = X˜t + τ
cC˜t. (2.15)
In both cases, transfers X˜t are used to balance the government budget every period when
a transitory surplus or deficit (X˜t < 0 or X˜t > 0, respectively) is generated.5
3. Competitive equilibrium and the government’s problem
The competitive equilibrium and the balanced growth path are characterized in this sec-
tion. A numerical procedure to solve for the dynamics of variables in levels and the
government’s problem is also discussed.
5In our setting, since labor is elastically supplied, taxing its rent might distort saving, but by less than
when taxing directly capital income. On the other hand, income taxes is a mixture between labor and
capital income taxes. Hence, results under alternative tax scenarios (total income taxes, labor income
taxes or some mixture of them) should be expected to fall between those reached under private capital
and consumption taxes.
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3.1. The competitive equilibrium and the balanced growth path
Starting from an initial state, K˜0, K˜
g
0 > 0, the competitive equilibrium is a set of al-
locations
n
C˜t, ht, L˜t, K˜t+1, I˜
k
t , Y˜t, C˜
g
t , K˜
g
t+1, I˜
g
t
o∞
t=0
, a set of prices p˜ = {rt, w˜t}∞t=0 and a
fiscal policy π˜ =
³
κ¯i, η, τk, τ c,
n
X˜t
o∞
t=0
´
, such that, given p˜ and π˜: (i) {C˜t, ht, K˜t+1}∞t=0
maximize households’ welfare [satisfying (2.7)-(2.10)]; (ii) {K˜t+1, L˜t}∞t=0 satisfy the profit-
maximizing conditions [(2.3)-(2.4)], and I˜kt accumulates according to (2.5); (iii) {C˜gt , K˜gt+1, I˜gt }∞t=0
evolve according to (2.12)-(2.11); (iv) the budget constraint of the public sector [either
(2.14) under capital income taxes or (2.15) under consumption taxes] and the technology
constraint (2.2) to produce Y˜t hold; finally, (iv) markets clear every period,
L˜t = ht, (3.1)
Y˜t = C˜t + C˜
g
t + I˜
k
t + I˜
g
t . (3.2)
A balanced growth path (bgp) is defined as an equilibrium path along which aggregate
variables either stay constant or grow at a constant rate. Barro (1990) and Jones and
Manuelli (1997), among others, have shown that cumulative inputs must present constant
returns to scale in the private production process (i.e., α+ θg + θk = 1). Additionally, rt
must be constant and high enough for the equilibrium to display positive steady-growth
(hereinafter, variables with bar “−” denote values along the bgp). From now on, we will
focus on the special case in which α + θg + θk = 1. Under these conditions, it is easy to
show from the equilibrium conditions, that Y˜t, C˜t, K˜t, K˜
g
t , C˜
g
t and X˜t must all grow at
the same constant rate along the bgp, denoted by γ¯ hereinafter, while bounded variables,
such as tax rates, rt and ht, must be constant.
From (2.8), a positive long-term growth rate is achieved whenever
γ¯ =
©
β
£
1− δk + (1− τk)r¯
¤ª 1
1−ρ(1−θ) − 1 > 0⇔ r¯ > 1− β(1− δ
k)
(1− τk)β . (3.3)
However, even though γ¯ will then be positive, it cannot get so high that allow households
to follow a chain-letter action [(2.10) must hold on the bgp], i.e.,
lim
t→∞
ρ(1− h¯)(1−ρ)(1−θ)K˜0 (1 + γ¯)βt (1 + γ¯)th
C˜0(1 + γ¯)t
i1−ρ(1−θ) = 0⇔ β(1 + γ¯)ρ(1−θ) < 1, (3.4)
which also ensures that time-aggregate utility (2.6) remains finite.
3.2. The financing system
The aim of the paper is to discuss the relevance, in terms of welfare gains, of considering
a short-run policy instrument, instead of maintaining a constant level of the public in-
vestment/output ratio for the whole transition. To this end, and to isolate the impact of
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a given choice of η on welfare from that produced by possible changes in distorting taxes
(either in τk or τ c), tax rates are assumed to be constant.
The level of the tax rate is such that lump-sum transfers will be zero along the bgp, so
X¯ = 0. Therefore, by combining (2.14) and (2.15) with (2.13), (2.12) and (2.3), tax rates
under capital and private consumption taxes are:
τ c = 0 and τk = (κ¯i + κc) /α, (3.5)
τ c = (κ¯i + κc)Y/C and τk = 0, (3.6)
where Y/C is constant along the bgp. Along the transition, any deviation from the long-
run target is assumed to be financed through lump-sum transfers. Hence, under capital
income taxes, plugging (3.5) into (2.14) and using (2.12) and (2.13),
X˜t = (κit − κ¯i) Y˜t, (3.7)
while under consumption taxes, by setting (3.5) into (2.14) and using also (2.12) and
(2.13),
X˜t =
"
(κc + κit)− (κc + κ¯i)
µ
C˜t/Y˜t
C/Y
¶#
Y˜t. (3.8)
Summing up, changes in the short-run policy instrument, η, can only alter the public
investment/output ratio and the tax base along the transition, but they do not affect the
associated tax rate. Although far from realistic, this simple financing rule is convenient
for addressing the main issues in this paper, as well as being an appropriate benchmark
for future extensions.
3.3. The benchmark calibration
The calibration roughly captures the main bgp characteristics of industrialized economies
over the eighties. The time unit is considered to be one quarter. It reproduces on the
bgp an annual after-tax net capital rate of return of 6%, an average proportion of working
time, h¯, of 1/3, and a 2.5% annual growth rate.
Parameter values are: δk = .025, δg = .0125, θ = 1.20, α = .36, θg = .20, and
θk = .44, so that α + θg + θk = 1.6 Schuknecht and Tanzi (1997) is followed to set κc
equal to 17%. Following Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995),
total public investment is about 30% of total investment, which leads to an average public
investment/output ratio of 7%. This is taken as the initial level of κ¯i. Finally, β = .996,
and ρ and z are chosen to maintain the after-tax net capital rate of return, the level of h¯
and the benchmark growth rate at the values mentioned above. Transfers are assumed to
be zero initially and the associated tax rate is computed residually from (3.5) and (3.6).
As a result, under private consumption taxes, ρ = .35, F = .24 , τk = 0 and τ c = .52,
while under capital income taxes, ρ = .34 , F = .59 , τ c = 0 and τk = .67.
6In the empirical literature, estimations of θg vary from .06 in Ratner (1983), to .20 in Lynde and
Richmond (1993) and to the more questionable .39 in Aschauer (1989).
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The main difference between the two alternative tax systems is the value of the scale
factor F , which is adjusted to replicate the 2.5% annual growth rate. Consequently,
welfare paths between the alternative tax scenarios considered are not comparable.
3.4. Solving for the dynamics of level variables
The competitive equilibrium cannot be analytically solved, so a numerical solution is re-
quired. However, numerical techniques are designed to solve for the dynamics of variables
with a well defined steady-state, which is not the case for variables in levels in endogenous
growth models. An alternative approach is usually to deal with normalized level variables.
Hereinafter, Zt will denote the normalized level of Z˜t, Zt = Z˜t/(1+ γ¯)t, which will grow at
a zero rate along the bgp. But the steady-state value of Zt is not well defined, so standard
numerical methods applied directly to normalized variables cannot be used either.
In that setting, it is fairly simple to solve for stationary ratios, but that strategy
precludes the possibility of analyzing welfare issues, for which level variables are needed.
We describe next a procedure that uses the dynamics of stationary ratios to recover the
equilibrium path for normalized level variables, starting from a given initial state of the
economy.7
(i) In terms of stationary ratios: ct = C˜t/K˜t, k
g
t = K˜
g
t /K˜t, yt = Y˜t/K˜t and kt+1 =
K˜t+1/K˜t, competitive equilibrium conditions (2.7)-(2.15) can be reduced to a system of 6
equations in c, kg, y, k, r and h,
kt+1
ct+1
ct
=
(
β
µ
1− ht+1
1− ht
¶(1−ρ)(1−θ) £
1− δk + (1− τk)rt+1
¤) 11−ρ(1−θ)
, (3.9)
ρ
1− ρ =
(1 + τ c) ct
(1− α)yt
ht
1− ht
, (3.10)
yt = ct + κcyt + kt+1 − (1− δk) + κ¯iy¯
µ
yt
y¯
¶1+η µ
kgt
k¯g
¶−η
, (3.11)
rt = αyt, (3.12)
yt = Fh
1−α
t (k
g
t )
θg , (3.13)
kt+1 =
1
kgt+1
"
(1− δg) kgt + κ¯iy¯
µ
yt
y¯
¶1+η µ
kgt
k¯g
¶−η#
, (3.14)
where (3.9) corresponds to (2.8); (3.10) comes from combining (2.9) with (2.4) and (3.1);
(3.11) combines (2.7) (holding as an equality) with (2.3), (2.4), (2.12), (2.13) and ei-
ther (2.14) under capital income taxes or (2.15) under consumption taxes; (3.12) and
(3.13) come directly from (2.3) and (2.2), respectively; finally, (3.14) combines (2.13)
with (2.11).8
7Novales et al. (1999) describes an alternative method to solve for the dynamics of level variables in
endogenous growth models.
8The system might be reduced to a system of three equations in ct, ht and k
g
t , but that does not
significantly simplify the computations.
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(ii) Use values for structural parameters to solve (3.9)-(3.14) for the bgp.
(iii) Log-linearize (3.9)-(3.14) around the bgp. A log-linear based approach is used to
solve for the dynamics of stationary ratios [Uhlig (1999)]. V (t) includes the beginning-of-
period state variables, just kgt in our case; Q(t) is the vector of real variables (ct, yt, rt, ht, kt+1).
Their values on the bgp are denoted by V¯ and Q¯, and vˆ(t) and qˆ(t) denote log-deviations of
V (t) and Q(t) around V¯ and Q¯, respectively. More compactly, a log-linear approximation
to conditions (3.9)-(3.14) can be rewritten as:
0 = Avˆ(t+ 1) +Bvˆ(t) + Cqˆ(t), (3.15)
0 = Fvˆ(t+ 2) +Gvˆ(t+ 1) +Hvˆ(t) + Jqˆ(t+ 1) +Kqˆ(t), (3.16)
where those conditions showing dynamics of any variable in Q(t) (i.e., (3.9) in our case)
are included in (3.16), and matrices A, B, C,..., are functions of all structural and fiscal
policy parameters.9
(iv) The following log-linear law of motion for Q(t) and V (t) is assumed:
vˆ(t+ 1) = P vˆ(t), (3.17)
qˆ(t) = Svˆ(t), (3.18)
where P and S are free matrices of dimension (1x1) and (5x1). Next, conditions (3.15)-
(3.16) are directly solved by the undetermined coefficients method, imposing the eigenval-
ues of P to be inside the unit circle, since otherwise Q(t) and V (t) would present explosive
paths.
(v) Starting at (K0, K
g
0), we have k
g
0 = K
g
0/K0, and values of C0, Y0, r0, h0 and k1 are
directly obtained from


C0
Y0
r0
h0
k1


=


K0 0 0 0 0
0 K0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1


Q(0), (3.19)
where, from (3.18), Q(0) = exp
£
S
¡
ln kg0 − ln k¯g
¢
+ ln Q¯
¤
= (c0 y0 r0 h0 k1)
0
, and kg1 is
obtained from (3.17).
(vi) K1 and K
g
1 (the state of the economy next period) are easily recovered from k1:
K1 =
K0k1
(1 + γ¯)
and Kg1 = k
g
1K1.
(vii) Time series for normalized variables for successive periods are recovered by going
recursively through steps (v) and (vi). Stability of the resulting time series is guaranteed
since appropriate stability conditions were implemented when solving (3.15)-(3.16).
9Details for the log-linearization of (3.9)-(3.14), together with matrices A, B, C,..., are shown in the
appendix.
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3.5. Solving for the government’s problem
The economy is assumed to start on the bgp associated to the benchmark calibration,
with an initial public investment/output ratio of 7% and a public capital stock, Kg0 , of
100.10 The public sector chooses κ¯i and η to maximize the representative household’s
welfare along the competitive equilibrium allocation. A standard search method is used
to numerically handle this control problem.
Given the tax system, the initial state (K0, K
g
0) and a pair (κ¯i, η): (a) (3.9)-(3.14) is
solved for the bgp and the level of γ¯ is obtained; (b) the process described in the previous
subsection allows to recovering time series of Ct and ht from the log-linear approximation
(3.15)-(3.16); (c) the utility of the representative consumer is evaluated11
∞X
t=0
(£
β(1 + γ¯)ρ(1−θ)
¤t
[Cρt (1− ht)1−ρ]
1−θ
1− θ −
βt
1− θ
)
; (3.20)
(e) the process is repeated for any feasible policy (κ¯i, η), and the one maximizing (3.20)
will be the welfare-maximizing choice.
To evaluate the infinite sum in (3.20), a truncated version with T ∗ periods is used,
where T ∗ is chosen so that equilibrium time series are close enough to the bgp.12 For each
policy, time series {Ct, ht}T ∗t=0 are used to estimate welfare up to period T ∗:
T ∗X
t=0
(£
β(1 + γ¯)ρ(1−θ)
¤t
[Cρt (1− ht)1−ρ]
1−θ
1− θ
)
− 1
(1− β) (1− θ) . (3.21)
After period T ∗, the economy is considered to be close enough to the bgp associated to
the implemented policy. Therefore, according to (3.20), since β(1+ γ¯)ρ(1−θ) < 1 [by (3.4)],
the term
∞X
t=T ∗+1
£
β(1 + γ¯)ρ(1−θ)
¤t £
CρT∗(1− h¯)1−ρ
¤1−θ
1− θ (3.22)
=
£
CρT ∗(1− h¯)1−ρ
¤1−θ £β(1 + γ¯)ρ(1−θ)¤T∗+1
(1− θ) [1− β(1 + γ¯)ρ(1−θ)]
approximates aggregate utility after period T ∗, which is added-up to the numerical value
obtained from (3.21).13
10The initial state is Kg0 = 100 and K0 = 100/k¯
g. The welfare-maximizing policy is shown to be
invariant to this choice.
11The feasible range of welfare is bounded because: (i) the numerical procedure imposes the competitive
equilibrium to be on the stable manifold and hence, Ct and ht eventually stabilize, and (ii) γ¯ is bounded
from above by (3.4). Moreover, since the single time-period utility is continuous and strictly concave and
the choice set is convex, there exists at most one interior solution to the government problem.
12T ∗ is chosen so that
¯¯
XT∗ − X¯
¯¯
< 10−3, with T ∗ < 1500, due to computational restrictions.
13Notice that (3.21) and (3.22) must be computed simultaneously, because T ∗ and CT∗ depend on the
whole transitional dynamics up to period T ∗.
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In the following sections, the main results of the policy experiment and the sensitiv-
ity of the main conclusions to the choice of some parameter values in the economy are
discussed.
4. The public investment rule
The public sector commits to following the public investment rule (2.13). Therefore, there
exists a whole continuum of potential paths for κit consistent with reaching the long-run
target κ¯i, depending upon the selected short-run policy instrument, η. Several aspects
are discussed in this section: (a) the effect of η over the transitional dynamics of main
macroeconomic variables, for a given level of κ¯i; (b) the welfare-maximizing policy when
simultaneously choosing κ¯i and η and (c) the sensitivity of the main results to the choice
of the tax system.
4.1. Transitional dynamics and the public investment rule
To evaluate the welfare incidence of any policy, we need to consider the effects, over
the whole transition process, on: (i) the long-run growth rate, (ii) the initial impact on
private consumption and leisure, (iii) the convergence speed to the new bgp and (iv)
the accumulation of productive factors along the transition. Obviously, (i) and (ii) are
important elements for characterizing welfare effects. In relation to (iii), the convergence
speed provides a relative weight to policy effects along the transition versus long-term
effects.14 Finally, the accumulation of capital factors in the short-run stimulates output
and consumption along the transition. In relation to the public investment rule (2.13),
the choice of η does not have long-run effects, but it may influence (ii), (iii) and (iv),
while κ¯i might affect all the described features.
Table 4.1 shows the convergence speed and the initial impact on the main macroeco-
nomic variables when alternative long-run targets for κ¯i of either 4% (below the starting
7% level) or 10% are pursued by the government, combined with alternative levels of the
short-run policy instrument (η equal to−1.20, 0 and 1.20), under consumption and capital
income taxes.15 Figures 4.1-4.4 show time paths for the public investment/output ratio,
κit, normalized consumption, Ct, working time, ht, and the gross private capital growth
rate, κt, under each tax system and parameterization considered in table 4.1. Several
conclusions can be drawn from this policy experiment.
[INSERT TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE]
The long-run target on κit, κ¯i, is reached in just one period when η = 0.16 Figure 4.1
14The convergence speed is measured here as the number of periods to cover half the distance between
the initial and the final equilibrium bgp [as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)]. Chamley (1981) and
Auerbach et al. (1983) have already discussed the importance of the convergence speed in welfare analysis.
15Qualitative results are quite robust to the magnitude of η, the sign of η being the relevant aspect.
16However, the economy displays transition. In addition to η = 0, δk and δg need to be equal to one
for the economy to jump to the new steady-state in just one period.
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shows that κit initially overshoots κ¯i when η = 1.20 (η > 0, in general), but convergence
to the new bgp occurs rapidly, precisely because of the nature of the policy rule (2.13); on
the other hand, κit never overshoots κ¯i, and convergence to κ¯i is much slower. Moreover,
for sufficiently negative levels of η, it could be the case that κit would initially move in
opposite direction to κ¯i, before approaching very slowly (i.e., see figure 4.1 under capital
income taxes, for η = −1.20 and either κ¯i = 10% or κ¯i = 4%).
Convergence speed to the new bgp reduces significantly when η takes negative values,
independently of the financing system and the level of κ¯i (see table 4.1), approaching zero
when η takes highly negative values.17
The initial impact on C˜t and ht highly depends on the downsizing/upsizing nature of
κ¯i, but also on the tax system considered. Under consumption taxes (see table 4.1 and
figures 4.2-4.4), a reduction in κ¯i, from 7% to 4% in the example, has an initial positive
impact on C˜t, ht and I˜kt . Under these circumstances, a positive level of η emphasizes this
initial positive impact on C˜t and on I˜kt , while ht is less stimulated, since as κit starts
falling below κ¯i, more resources are available to consume and save. However, I˜gt suffers
from an important initial reduction. An opposite behavior is found when κ¯i is chosen
above its initial level.
Under capital income taxes (see table 4.1 and figures 4.2-4.4), a reduction in κ¯i be-
low 7% implies an immediate decline of the capital tax rate [from condition (3.5)], thus
savings turning now more attractive for households. For a significant reduction of κ¯i, the
substitution effect on private consumption might become even more important than the
income effect and, consequently, C˜t might initially decline. In addition, ht and I˜kt initially
raise. Moreover, as it was mentioned above, when a policy of reducing κ¯i is combined
with a negative level of the short-run policy instrument, κit may be above 7% in the early
periods of the transition, I˜gt initially increasing, in spite of the reduction on the long-run
public investment ratio (26.3% for η = −1.20 versus −41.8% for η = 0 and −73.8% for
η = 1.20). An opposite behavior is found when κ¯i rises above its initial level.
4.2. Welfare-maximizing short-run policy instrument for a given level of κ¯i
We turn now our attention to the welfare-maximizing level of the short-run policy instru-
ment, ηˆ, conditional on a given level of the long-run target κ¯i. We assume that the fiscal
authority pursues a given level of κ¯i, and it must choose the best way to reach it among
a continuum of alternative paths, by deciding on the value of η in (2.13).
Under our assumption on public financing, the tax rate is affected by κ¯i but not by
η. Therefore, changes in η will not aid the government to reduce the associated tax rate,
which is, potentially, the most important negative effect of an increase in κ¯i. However,
certain values for η might emphasize the positive impact of increasing the productive in-
vestment ratio, allowing for κit to be well above κ¯i along the transition, and this transitory
increment being financed through lump-sum taxes as described in (3.7) and (3.8).
17In that case, matrix P in (3.17) has an eigenvalue close to one, which would imply unfeasible explosive
trajectories for normalized time series.
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In general, we will have κit > κ¯i along the transition when either (i) κ¯i > 7% and
η > 0 or (ii) κ¯i < 7% and η < 0. Figure 4.5 shows the welfare maximizing short-run
policy instrument ηˆ as a function of κ¯i, revealing that, indeed, ηˆ > 0 when κ¯i > 7%,
while ηˆ < 0 for any κ¯i < 7%, with independence of the tax system considered. In the
previous subsection, we showed that these strategies imply an initial utility loss, since
private consumption and leisure are initially discouraged or, at least, less stimulated than
under alternative policies. Consequently, given κ¯i, the level of ηˆ must compensate this
initial utility loss with more important welfare gains along the transition. Since η does not
affect the long-run growth rate, the ability to compensate the initial utility loss must come
through an stimulus on the short-run accumulation of private and/or public capital, which
will allow for the initial negative response of output, private consumption and leisure to
become positive after a short enough number of periods.
Table 4.2 shows the main dynamic characteristics of the transition corresponding to
values of ηˆ associated to κ¯i = 4% and κ¯i = 10%. Under capital and consumption taxes,
ηˆ is equal to −1.51 and −1.64, respectively, when κ¯i = 4%, making the economy to
converge to the bgp at its lowest speed. On the other hand, ηˆ is equal to 1.25 and 3.06
when κ¯i = 10%.
In the table 4U shows the percent increment on welfare under ηˆ with respect to be
η = 0, for a common level of κ¯i. For instance, when κ¯i = 4%, 4U is equal to 23.3%
and 21.8% under capital and consumption taxes, respectively, being just 1.61% and .78%
when κ¯i = 10%. The intuition behind this significant difference on welfare improvement
comes from the implied speed of the adjustment process. Convergence is quite fast when
ηˆ > 0. Hence, the positive impact of the short-run policy instrument on welfare cannot
be very important, since its effect operates only along the transition. On the other hand,
convergence is very slow when ηˆ is highly negative, so that the positive effect of being
η 6= 0 extends throughout a large number of periods.
[INSERT TABLE 4.2 ABOUT HERE]
4.3. Coordination between short- and long-run policy instruments
The remainder of the section is devoted to jointly determining the welfare-maximizing lev-
els of κ¯i and η, denoted by κ¯+i and η+. The endogenous public investment rule considered
in Barro (1990), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) and Turnovsky (1996, 2000), among many
others, is a special case of (2.13) with η = 0. Obviously, the flexibility to simultaneously
decide on η and κ¯i must lead to a welfare improvement in relation to the constant-size
rule. Hence, the aim of this section is to characterize the magnitude of this welfare gain.
Table 4.3 summarizes the main results obtained for the baseline calibration. Welfare
obtained when the economy stays on the initial bgp is compared with that obtained: (i)
when η and κ¯i are chosen simultaneously to maximize welfare (the optimal coordinating
policy) and (ii) when κ¯i is the welfare-maximizing level under the restriction η = 0.
[INSERT TABLE 4.3 ABOUT HERE]
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First, independently of the tax system considered, κ¯+i is lower than the optimal choice
of κ¯i under η = 0 (1.13% versus 3.28% under capital income taxes and 29.0% versus 29.6%
under consumption taxes). The intuition of this result is the following: this smaller level
of κ¯i has a positive impact on welfare, since the associated tax rate becomes lower along
the whole transition, but it has a negative effect through the reduction of public capital
accumulation along the bgp. Nevertheless, this negative impact could be compensated by
setting a level of η that allows for the public investment ratio to be above the final level of
κ¯i along the transition, the implied deficit being financed through lump-sum taxes. This
way, κ¯+i is below the one obtained under a short-run passive policy.
Second, the welfare-maximizing coordination between κ¯i and η allows for the public
investment ratio to be higher than κ¯+i along the transition, with independence of whether
κ¯+i is above or below its initial value, slowly declining towards the chosen long-run target.
Third, the welfare improvement of choosing η and κ¯i simultaneously is greater when
the implied convergence process is slow, as already discussed in the previous subsection.
This is achieved by coordinating a certain downsizing of κ¯i with a negative level of η.
This way, the government is able to maintain the public investment ratio above κ¯i during
a long number of periods, financing this gap with lump-sum taxes, and extending this
positive transitory effect throughout a long interval of time.
Fourth, the optimality of reducing the long-run public investment ratio strongly de-
pends on the cost of raising resources to finance public investment, for which the tax base
becomes crucial.
The welfare gain associated to a policy coordination scheme highly depends on the
tax system considered. In the baseline calibration, downsizing κ¯i from 7% until 1.13%,
coordinated with η = −1.49, maximizes welfare under capital income taxes. This level
of κ¯+i is far below the optimal 3.28% obtained under η = 0. Relative to keeping the
economy on the initial bgp, with κit = 7% for any period, aggregate utility increases by
15.3% when η = 0 and κ¯i = 3.28, while it increases by up to 60.4% under the welfare-
maximizing coordination policy. The slow convergence induced by the associated negative
level of η produces this large difference. On the other hand, under consumption taxes,
κ¯+i = 29.0%, with η+ = 1.27, only slightly lower than the optimal level of κ¯i, 29.6%,
under η = 0. The faster convergence induced by the welfare-maximizing coordination
makes aggregate utility to increase very similarly: by 29.2% when η = 0 and κ¯i = 29.6%,
and by 29.9% when choosing η jointly with κ¯i.
Summarizing, the simple public investment rule assumed in (2.13) allows the govern-
ment to decide on several types of paths for κit:
(i) long-run downsizing or upsizing, with a constant ratio κit throughout the whole tran-
sition (κ¯i < 7% or κ¯i > 7%, with η = 0),
(ii) long-run downsizing, initial overshooting of κit and fast-convergence (κ¯i < 7% and
η > 0),
(iii) long-run downsizing, no initial overshooting of κit and slow-convergence (κ¯i < 7%
and η < 0),
(iv) long-run upsizing, initial overshooting of κit and fast-convergence (κ¯i > 7% and
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η > 0), and
(v) long-run upsizing, no initial overshooting of κit and slow-convergence (κ¯i > 7% and
η < 0).
For the baseline calibration, (iii) is the welfare-maximizing strategy under capital income
taxes (more distorting taxes), while (iv) is the optimal strategy under consumption taxes
(less distorting taxes). However, in the present context, the optimality of reducing the
long-run public investment ratio is not specific to the capital income tax scenario, since
changes in some structural parameters could reverse this result. Next section shows this
possibility.
5. Sensitivity analysis
It was shown in the previous section that reducing the long-run public investment/output
ratio maximizes welfare under capital income taxes, but not under consumption taxes.
We now perform a sensitivity analysis showing that there are factors that could reverse
that result.
In particular, a high enough level of the output elasticity of private capital, α, makes
long-run downsizing to be optimal under private consumption taxes, the opposite being
true under capital income taxes. Moreover, independently of the tax system considered,
downsizing improves welfare when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of private
consumption, 1/θ, and/or the output elasticity of public capital, θg, are low enough, or
when the unproductive public expenditure/output ratio, κc, is sufficiently high.
The sensitivity analysis modifies parameters independently, considering first α = .75,18
second θg = .06 [the value fitted in Ratner (1983)], third κc = .20 (only slightly higher
than the benchmark .17, since otherwise the initial steady-state growth rate would become
negative) and finally θ = 3 (a relatively high value for the risk aversion parameter). Table
4.4 summarizes the main results from this sensitivity analysis.
[INSERT TABLE 5.1 ABOUT HERE]
For α = .75, the shape of the welfare-maximizing coordination policy under both
tax systems reverses. Now, under capital income taxes, κ¯+i = 11.0% and η+ = 7.55,
while under private consumption taxes, κ¯+i = 2.5% and η+ = −1.41. The increment
on welfare, relative to staying on the initial bgp, is .71% and 2.70%, respectively. Under
capital income taxes, given κc, a higher level of α provokes that a lower tax rate on
capital income is needed to finance any given level of κ¯i [from (3.5)], since now private
capital is more productive. Therefore, taxing private capital accumulation becomes less
harmful for welfare the larger is α, and a higher level of κ¯i maximizes aggregate utility.
On the other hand, under consumption taxes, the crowding-out on consumption caused
by an increase in the public investment ratio is more important the higher is α, since
18This level is quite higher than the standard .36. However, it would be a reasonable value if private
capital is interpreted in a broad sense, for example, including physical as well as human capital (Romer
(1987)).
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now savings becomes more attractive. Consequently, a lower level of κ¯i would maximize
welfare.
Several aspects must be emphasized relative to the remaining cases. First, a larger level
of κc implies a higher taxation cost of increasing κ¯i, since the associated tax rate is now
higher every period. Second, a lower θg reduces the benefit of raising public capital, since
now public capital is less productive, and the externality factor θk increases.19 Finally, a
higher level of θ (i.e., a lower level of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution) increases
the importance of short-run effects on welfare. Hence the implemented policy rule must
punish less initial consumption, in exchange of lower long-run growth. Consequently, the
welfare-maximizing value of κ¯i is lower than in the baseline calibration, independently
of the tax system considered. For instance, for θg = .06, κ¯i is lower than the initial 7%
independently of the taxing scenario considered.
6. Conclusions
The coordination between short- and long-run policies has been extensively studied in
the monetary policy literature. However, little work has been done regarding the coordi-
nation between long- and short-run fiscal policy measures. In this paper, it is assumed
that, given a long-run target for the public investment/output ratio, the government fol-
lows a particular rule that makes the public investment/output ratio to react along the
transition according to the current productivity of public capital relative to its long-run
level. This public investment rule is more flexible than those commonly considered in the
literature [Barro (1990), Turnovsky (1996, 2000), among many others], where the public
investment/output ratio is assumed to remain constant over time.
In comparison with the Barro-type rule, and under alternative taxing scenarios, we
find significant welfare gains when coordinating the long- and the short-run policies. We
showed that the optimal coordination allows for the public investment ratio to be higher
than its long-run target along the transition, no matter whether it is higher or lower than
the initial level of 7%, to then decline monotically towards it. This way, the government
maintains the public investment ratio above its long-run target, financing this gap with
lump-sum taxes, and extending this positive transitory effect throughout the transition.
Therefore, an optimal policy coordination inducing a low convergence would achieve a
higher welfare improvement than alternative fast convergence policies, since the positive
transitory impact would extend throughout a larger number of periods. On that score, for
the baseline calibration, downsizing from 7% to 1.13%, coordinated with a low convergence
short-run policy, maximizes welfare under capital income taxes, while a long-run upsizing
from 7% to 29.0%, combined with a fast convergence short-run policy, would be optimal
under consumption taxes.
The optimality of downsizing the long-run public investment ratio is not specific to
the capital income tax scenario, since changes in some structural parameters reverse
this result. For instance, a sufficiently high productivity of private capital makes the
19Recall that the condition α+ θg + θk = 1 is always imposed.
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combination of downsizing and a low-convergence short-run policy to be optimal under
consumption taxes. Additionally, for sufficiently high levels of the unproductive public
expenditure/output ratio, and low enough levels of the public capital elasticity and the
elasticity of substitution, long-run downsizing becomes optimal, independently of the tax
system.
Coordinating short- and long-run fiscal policies is an issue of utmost interest that re-
quires extending the analysis made in this paper in several directions. First, more complex
and realistic financing structures should be considered to escape from the neutrality of
financing the short-run active policy, allowing that changes in the short-run policy affect
the tax rate. Another extension to the paper regards the particular shape of the public
investment rule. Still more interesting active policy rules could be considered. For in-
stance, the public sector could have several short-run policy tools at its disposal, allowing
for the government to select among an even higher set of public investment plans. In
addition, since politicians increasingly make decisions according to the evolution of real
macroeconomic variables, specifying a reasonable policy rule would be a convenient way
to describe the performance of public expenditure plans.
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7. Appendix: Log-linear optimality conditions
Uhlig (1999) proposes a procedure where optimal conditions are log-linearized without
need of differentiating. Let vˆt and zˆt denote the variables in log-deviation to their steady-
state, vˆt = ln
¡
Vt/V¯
¢
and zˆt = ln
¡
Yt/Y¯
¢
. Xa can be approximated:µ
V
V¯
¶a
= exp
µ
a ln
µ
V
V¯
¶¶
= exp(av) ' (1 + avˆ)⇒ V a ' V¯ a(1 + avˆ). (7.1)
In addition, vˆzˆ ' 0 if variables are close enough to their steady-state values. Log-linearized
versions of (3.9)-(3.14) are (all variables in log-deviations about steady-state):
cˆt+1 − cˆt + kˆt+1 +
ρ˜θ˜h¯
1− h¯
(hˆt+1 − hˆt)−
θ˜r¯k(1− τ¯k)
R¯
rˆt+1 = 0, (7.2)
cˆt − yˆt +
1
1− h¯
hˆt = 0, (7.3)
y¯yˆt − c¯cˆt − κiy¯(1 + η)yˆt − κiy¯ηvˆt − κcy¯yˆt − (1 + γ¯)kˆt+1 = 0, (7.4)
r¯rˆt − αy¯yˆt = 0, (7.5)
yˆt − (1− α)hˆt − θgkˆgt = 0, (7.6)³
kˆt+1 + kˆ
g
t+1
´
(1 + γ¯)k¯g − (1− δg)k¯gkˆgt − κiy¯(1 + η)yˆt − κiy¯ηkˆgt = 0, (7.7)
where kˆt+1 =
h
ln
³
K˜t+1
K˜t
´
− ln(1 + γ¯)
i
, θ˜ = 1
1−ρ(1−θ) , ρ˜ = (1−ρ)(1−θ), γ¯ = κizh¯1−α
¡
k¯g
¢θg−1−
δg, y¯ = zh¯1−α
¡
k¯g
¢θg , r¯ = αy¯, and R¯ = £1 + (1− τ¯k)r¯ − δk¤. Tax-rates are constant.
Steady-state conditions have been used to simplify these expressions. The endogenous
state variable is kˆgt = ln k
g
t − ln k¯g, denoted in general terms by vˆ(t). Endogenous control
variables are included in zˆ(t)0 =
³
yˆt, cˆt, hˆt, rˆt, kˆt+1
´
. From (7.2)-(7.7), log-linear conditions
can be rewritten:
Avˆt+1 +Bvˆt + Cyˆt = 0, (7.8)
Fvˆt+2 +Gvˆt+1 +Hvˆt + Jyˆt+1 +Kyˆt = 0, (7.9)
where
A =
¡
0 0 0 0 (1 + γ¯)k¯g
¢0
, B =
¡
0 −κiy¯η 0 −θg
¡
−(1− δg)k¯g − κiy¯η
¢ ¢0
,
C =


−1 1 1
1−h¯ 0 0
y¯(1− κi(1 + η)− κc) −c¯ 0 0 −(1 + γ¯)
−αy¯ 0 0 r¯ 0
1 0 −(1− α) 0 0
−κiy¯(1 + η) 0 0 0 (1 + γ¯)k¯g


,
F = 0, G = 0, H = 0,
J =
³
0 1 θ˜ρ˜h¯
1−h¯ −
θ˜r¯(1−τ¯k)
R¯
0
´
, K =
³
0 −1 − θ˜ρ˜h¯
1−h¯ 0 1
´
.
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List of figures
Figure 4.1: The dynamics of the public investment/output ratio
Note: each line shows the transitional dynamics of the corresponding variable for 100
periods, starting at a common state. In the legend of each graph, g=κ¯i and nu=η.
The initial public investment/output ratio is always 7%. Lines with triangles keep
η=0, lines with crosses correspond to η=1.20 and lines with squares to η= -1.20.
Additionally, the dotted-lines correspond to κ¯i=.04, while the solid lines correspond
to κ¯i=.10. The solid line with circles shows the path when the economy stays on
the initial balanced growth path.
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Figure 4.2: The dynamics of normalized consumption
Note: see footnote to figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.3: The dynamics of time-to-labor share
Note: see footnote to figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.4: The dynamics of private capital growth rate
Note: see footnote to figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.5: Optimal levels of η for a committed long-run public investment ratio
Optimal Short-Run Public Investment Policy
Capital Income Taxes
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Note: each line shows the welfare-maximizing level of η, ηˆ, as a function of the long-
run public investment ratio target, κ¯i. The economy starts with an initial public
investment/output ratio of 7%.
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Table 4.1: Transitional dynamics and steady-state properties
CAPITAL INCOME TAXES
Public
investment rule
Convergence
speed
Percent initial impact Steady-state values
? ?i (%) Periods C Ik Ig h Y ? (%) h Ik/Y C/Y
4.0 122.6 -1.9 33.4 26.3 3.3 2.9 0.81 0.33 0.08 0.65-1.20 10.0 114.2 6.3 -31.1 -30.3 -6.6 -4.1 0.21 0.34 0.13 0.66
4.0 24.0 -0.4 45.9 -41.8 1.5 1.8 0.81 0.33 0.08 0.650 10.0 31.9 0.8 -34.4 42.5 -0.7 -0.2 0.21 0.34 0.13 0.66
4.0 12.7 0.8 64.4 -73.8 -0.0 0.8 0.81 0.33 0.08 0.651.20 10.0 15.9 -4.5 -44.0 221.3 5.8 3.9 0.21 0.34 0.13 0.66
CONSUMPTION TAXES
Public
investment rule
Convergence
speed
Percent initial impact Steady-state values
? ?i (%) Periods C Ik Ig h Y ? (%) h Ik/Y C/Y
4.0 120.4 4.4 3.8 -9.8 3.2 2.4 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.48-1.20 10.0 87.4 -2.3 -2.6 7.7 -4.5 -2.1 0.83 0.34 0.32 0.41
4.0 30.9 4.9 7.6 -41.7 2.5 1.9 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.480 10.0 24.5 -4.5 -3.8 42.3 -1.9 -0.4 0.83 0.34 0.32 0.41
4.0 17.3 5.4 12.5 -62.6 2.1 1.6 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.481.20 10.0 12.6 -6.0 -8.2 93.7 -0.1 0.8 0.83 0.34 0.32 0.41
Note: The column labelled speed shows the number of periods needed to cover half the distance
between the initial state and the final bgp. Benchmark calibration sets initially κ¯i=.07, γ¯=.62%
and h¯=.33. Initially, C/Y =.65 and Ik/Y =.11 under capital income taxes, while C/Y =.44 and
Ik/Y =.32 under consumption taxes.
Table 4.2: Welfare-maximizing levels of η for a committed level of κ¯i
CAPITAL INCOME TAXES
Public
investment rule
Convergence
speed
Percent initial impact
?i (%) ? Periods C Ik Ig h Y ?U(*) ? (%) ?k
4.0 -1.51 10e10 -2.4 31.3 54.3 3.8 3.3 23.3 0.81 0.58
10.0 1.25 15.6 -4.8 -44.6 232.8 6.1 4.1 1.6 0.20 0.75
CONSUMPTION TAXES
Public
investment rule
Convergence
speed
Percent initial impact
?i (%) ? Periods C Ik Ig h Y ?U(*) ? (%) ?c
4.0 -1.64 10e10 3.8 2.7 5.2 3.4 2.5 21.8 0.34 0.44
10.0 3.06 6.6 -7.3 -18.1 219.5 1.5 1.8 0.8 0.83 0.65
Note: see footnote of Table 4.1.
(*) It shows the percent increment in welfare under ηˆ with respect to the level obtained when
implementing a passive rule (η = 0) for a common value of κ¯i.
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Table 4.3: Optimal simultaneous choice of η and κ¯i under the benchmark calibration
CAPITAL INCOME TAXES
Public
investment rule
Convergence
speed
Percent initial impact
?i ? Periods C Ik Ig h Y ?U(*) ? (%)
Simultaneous
choice
1.13 -1.49 10e10 -1.8 56.6 116.0 2.7 2.2 60.4 0.48
Optimal ?i
given ?=0
3.28 0 24.1 -0.9 59.7 -52.1 2.0 2.1 15.3 0.80
CONSUMPTION TAXES
Public
investment rule
Convergence
speed
Percent initial impact
?i ? Periods C Ik Ig h Y ?U(*) ? (%)
Simultaneous
choice
29.0 1.27 15.1 -49.3 -21.6 450.8 -1.3 0.7 29.9 1.59
Optimal ?i
given ?=0
29.6 0 19.3 -45.3 -15.9 298.1 -11.4 -5.9 29.2 1.60
Note: see footnote in table 4.1.
(*) percent welfare gains under the jointly optimal values of κ¯i and η with respect to a situation
in which the economy stays along the initial bgp.
Table 5.1: Optimal simultaneous choice of η and κ¯i. Sensitivity analysis
CAPITAL INCOME TAXES
Public
investment rule
Convergence
speed
Percent initial impact
Alternative
parameters
?i ? Periods C Ik Ig h Y ?U(*) ? (%) ?k
?=0.75 11.0 7.55 0.59 10.1 -54.0 4,309 1.6 12.5 0.7 0.12 0.37
?c=0.20 0.98 -1.55 10e10 -2.4 76.1 197.0 3.0 2.0 143.6 0.0 0.58
?g=0.06 0.20 -1.10 10e10 0.8 63.0 109.4 0.6 1.7 79.7 0.01 0.47
?=3.0 0.11 -1.33 10e10 0.5 33.9 69.0 -0.2 0.2 7.9 0.00 0.50
CONSUMPTION TAXES
Alternative
parameters
Public
investment rule
Convergence
speed
Percent initial impact
?i ? Periods C Ik Ig h Y ?U(*) ? (%) ?c
?=0.75 2.5 -1.41 10e10 37.7 8.8 10.6 3.9 8.6 2.7 0.04 1.52
?c=0.20 26.5 0.35 14.7 -45.6 -21.3 420.3 -0.1 1.5 28.5 0.02 2.15
?g=0.06 2.5 -1.16 10e10 7.9 3.4 5.1 3.7 3.2 3.7 0.01 0.40
?=3.0 16.5 0.04 26.6 -15.8 -10.8 135.7 -3.3 -1.4 2.6 0.01 0.87
Note: See footnote to table 4.1.
(*) percent welfare gains under the jointly optimal values of κ¯i and η with respect to a situation
in which the economy stays along the initial bgp.
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